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Introduction
Prior to the current crisis, diverging current account imbalances in the euro area have significantly changed the net investment positions of the euro area's member countries. While in particular Germany accumulated substantial net foreign assets, southern European countries and Ireland heavily increased their net foreign debt positions. The common view links these macroeconomic imbalances to diverging wage growth, unit labour costs and inflation rates as well as national differences in investment and consumption (e.g. European
Commission 2010). As a general policy implication, today's crisis countries are being asked to readjust their wages and prices to regain international competitiveness and to reduce their net foreign debt by future current account surpluses.
Another strand of the literature links the emergence of current account imbalances to changed conditions on financial markets (Caballero et al. 2008 , Körner 2011 . Thereby, European financial market integration has been a positive credibility shock for the southern European countries. The attractiveness of southern Europe's financial markets improved relatively to the euro area core countries, such as Germany. This asymmetric change in financial market attractiveness might explain initial capital flows from the euro area core to the southern periphery as well as persistent current account deficits in the euro periphery and surpluses in the core of the euro area. If this setting describes a new equilibrium situation, then Europe might not need to worry about current account (im)balances.
Such a conclusion has been stated by Caballero et al. (2008) in their paper on US-Asia imbalances. Based on a dynamic general equilibrium model Caballero et al. (2008) showed that the Asian crisis was a negative credibility shock reducing the relative attractiveness of Asian financial markets against US financial markets. As a result, capital has persistently flowed from Asia to the US financial market. These flows created the observed divergence of current account balances between Asia and the US. Moreover the authors conclude that US current account deficits can be sustained via any of the three rebalancing channels i) future trade balance surpluses, ii) investment income from FDI or iii) a depreciation of the long run real exchange rate.
In this paper we adopt this theory for the euro area by using an augmented model that allows all three rebalancing channels to work in conjunction (Körner 2011) . The European monetary and financial integration is assumed to have bestowed positive credibility on former high inflation countries in southern Europe -a positive financial market shock from EMU participation. The simulated results are compared with actual data, which provides evidence that current account imbalances and in particular net foreign debt positions of crisis countries are far from sustainable. Alternative simulation scenarios with increasing investment or productivity allow to draw implications how today's crisis countries might adjust macroeconomic imbalances.
Macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area?

The common views on intra-euro area imbalances
Since the introduction of the euro until the financial crisis, euro area countries experienced a build-up of significant macroeconomic imbalances (European Commission 2008 . These imbalances became visible in divergent developments of current account balances and net foreign debt positions, as well as significant differences in growth rates of unit labour costs, consumer prices, investment and GDP.
Thereby, countries of the euro periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy) have developed current account deficits leading to strong increases in their net foreign debt positions. Rising unit labour costs and consumer prices, credit expansion and strong GDP growth accompanied the process in these countries. In contrast, most core countries of the euro area (Benelux, Austria, Finland) but in particular Germany have accumulated high net foreign asset positions (or reduced their net debt position) by running persistently high current account surpluses after the year 2000. Moreover, consumer prices, GDP and unit labour costs grew moderately in surplus countries relative to the periphery. In Germany and Austria unit labour costs almost kept the level of 1999 in real terms. Figures 1 and 2 show the divergence of current account balances and net international investment positions in the euro area.
In general, changes of the current account balance of whatever sign are not necessarily an indication of imbalances. They may simply reflect inter-temporal saving as well as consumption and investment preferences of private enterprises, households and governments (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1994) . Additionally, business cycles, demographic developments (De Santis and Lührmann 2006) and fiscal policy are important determinants of empirical realisations of the current account balance. Moreover, rising prices and unit labour costs and strong investment could be due to a catch-up of periphery countries within the euro area (Balassa 1964 , Samuelson 1964 . A more pessimistic explanation can be drawn from the theory of optimum currency areas. In a monetary union, relatively stronger growing consumer prices and unit labour costs in the euro periphery imply a real appreciation against the core countries, in particular Germany. From the perspective of the real exchange rate being a measure of cost and price competitiveness (Lipschitz and McDonald 1992; Arghyrou and Chortareas 2006, European Commission 2010) , the euro periphery lost competitiveness vis-à-vis euro core countries. The periphery's products have become relatively expensive compared to goods from core countries. Imports increased, exports decreased and the current account balance worsened alongside the trade balance. A pattern of diverging current account balances appeared with current account surpluses in most core countries and current account deficits in periphery countries. Capital flows from the core to the periphery are not the offsetting factor in this process but rather the necessary consequence of current account differences.
The common monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) was not able to counter these developments. It failed to steer against rising wages and inflation in the euro periphery as core countries' (in particular German) low wage and price growth kept average euro area inflation close to the central bank target of two per cent. The single nominal interest rate for the euro area in combination with dispersing national inflation rates (and inflation expectations) created too low real interest rates in high inflation countries and too high real interest rates in low inflation countries (Sturm and Wollmershäuser 2008, foreseen by Walters 1990) . The one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the EMU further fuelled the asymmetric economic development by providing pro-cyclical investment incentives. The nominal differences in wage and price inflation translated into real divergences.
In addition, "the long shadow of the fall of the wall" (Gros 2010) further promoted the buildup of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. In the recession following the postreunification boom German unemployment and public debt rocketed (Schnabl and Zemanek 2011) . During the second half of the 1990s, public wage austerity, high unemployment and also the integration of the Central and Eastern European countries into the European Union kept private sector wage growth down (Schnabl and Zemanek 2011). In contrast, based on overoptimistic expectations (Lane and Pels 2011), citizens of the euro periphery anticipated or expected continuing future income growth consequently increasing their present consumption and investment in exchange for future income (Tobin 1967 , Summers 1981 . Capital inflows and rising consumption and investment entrenched current account deficits.
According to the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) by Mundell (1961) , real imbalances either triggered by an asymmetric shock or adverse economic developments constitute a disequilibrium and need to be adjusted via a realignment of the real exchange rate. As no nominal exchange rate exist between euro area countries, the real exchange rate alignment depends on changing relative wages and prices between the core and the periphery.
However, low labour market flexibility in Europe (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992, European Commission 2008) has so far prevented timely real exchange rate realignment or large-scale labour migration. The latter seems to be on the rise as recent reports on a 25% drop in Greek nominal wages in 2011 and a 90% increase in migration of Greeks to Germany hint at (Rogers and Philippe 2012, Destatis 2012) . Thus, the OCA theory implicates that macroeconomic imbalances are a failure of economies in a monetary union to readjust to the equilibrium. Mundell (2000) himself doubts that the euro area thus constructed would be able to overcome these impediments -rightly so in hindsight.
An equilibrium view on intra-euro area imbalances
In contrast, Caballero et al. (2008) In the course of financial market integration, formerly high interest rates of periphery countries significantly fell to the established low levels of core countries. This convergence is visible in Figure 4 showing government bond yields of euro area countries. Since the middle of the 1990s, government bond yields converged to relatively low rates of German government bonds. Private lending rates did also converge. Figure 5 illustrates the crosscountry standard deviation of bank lending rates among euro area countries. Since 1999 banklending rates converged strongly as a result of financial market integration. The era of equal interest rates of core and periphery lasted for about one decade. During the current government debt crisis, government bond yields of periphery countries again increased significantly against the core's rates while bank-lending rates diverged only slightly. Cross-country standard deviation of lending rates among euro area countries 
Model properties
The model applies a setup with two regions of the euro area countries, named Periphery (euro periphery, labelled with superscript P) and Core (euro core, labelled with superscript C), each standing for a representative set of countries.
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Initially, both regions are assumed to be symmetric. In each of them stylized goods markets and more elaborate asset markets with investment, saving and production in assets in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Moore's (1997) 'trees' are modelled. As both regions are assumed to be open economies, excess supply and demand are equilibrated via current account transactions. One of the regions, namely periphery, experiences an unexpected financial market credibility shock. The shock leads to the emergence of persistent imbalances between the two regions in the model (in our case within the euro area) in terms of interest rates, current accounts and the global asset portfolio allocation constituting a new equilibrium.
The goods market
The goods market is modelled using CES preferences for a single country-specific good x produced in each region's country i at time t. The sum of all relative demands for the goods basket of each country i ≠ j is equal to the country's gross national product. Aggregate demand is equal to aggregate production on a global scale so there is no demand deficiency (unemployment) in the model. Aggregate production X, the sum of all countries' relative demands C for country i's good, has the following property:
is the CES parameter defining relative demand of region j for region i's good. For i = j , the value is the domestic demand elasticity given domestic consumption C. Each region j's aggregate production can be split into a scale (N) and a productivity component (Z) respectively, yielding X t j = N t j Z t j . Production's exogenously given rate of
which may be region-specific. The terms of trade of one of the regions is set as numéraire, here q t C = 1 . Consequently, total aggregate output X t over all
is the sum of individual regions. As countries of the periphery region experience a shock, their output before the financial market shock is X t=0 Po while production thereafter is denoted by X t>0 Pn .
The real exchange rate λ t CP is defined as the inverse ratio of the two regions' price levels P t i . It brings about equilibrium in the goods market by equating relative demands for each region's basket of goods in relation to the price charged for it: 
Total demand is equal to total output being the sum of the individual regions' output. The periphery's output before and after the financial market shock is converted by the region's terms of trade:
The asset market
The asset market is the part of the model creating the dynamics from which imbalances arise after the financial market shock. 
Asset demand arises from the inter-temporal balance of agents' wealth and the asset supply to be spent on. If a region's wealth exceeds its available asset supply, the surplus wealth is exported to and invested in more asset-abundant countries via the capital account. If the capital account is closed the interest rate serves as an equilibrator on the domestic market.
Asset demand has three components: a return on accumulated wealth, additions from population growth and deductions for investment. Specifically, asset demand is domestically determined by the return on existing assets minus endowment for new generations r t −ϑ For investing agents from the core region, the following condition needs to be met to make FDI in the periphery region with lower financial market parameter δ P profitable:
Foreign investment can alternatively be thought of as an exporting process. Financial market 'know-how' is exported from the region holding this knowledge in abundance to the deprived region. In this sense, FDI resembles net exports of goods with the difference of affecting the financial account rather than the current account. 5 These FDI costs can be thought of as acquiring a public license for conducting FDI or the costs of carrying out a joint venture with a domestic firm. They are generalized by the catchall parameter κ p .
Open economy properties
Export between regions takes place if there is an imbalance of supply and demand on the domestic asset market. While the trade balance TB t j is defined as the domestic production less domestic absorption from consumption and investment, the current account balance CA t j is the difference between changes in asset demand and asset supply of a region:
The current account is the dual of the financial account. The current account may be equivalently written in national accounts as the sum of net exports and net investment income NINV t j from abroad. With the share of total assets of region j invested in region i being α t ji the current account is:
The share of a region's total wealth invested in foreign assets α t ji is given by the sum of past current account surpluses -source of changes in the net investment position. The main difference with FDI is the change in property rights taking place when acquiring assets via the current account while for FDI only the income stream from returns on investment abroad is repatriated. Foreign asset shares and the share of domestic assets in the global portfolio µ t ij , i.e. all wealth in all regions, is given by:
The global portfolio share will be one of the benchmarks for model dynamics. It captures the longer lasting effects of imbalances between regions resulting from a shock to financial markets in the Periphery-region.
The shock
A shock to the financial markets in countries of the Periphery-region changes those countries' ability to convert assets used for production into capital assets tradable on financial markets.
A negative shock may be envisaged as a decrease in the number of safe assets as a reliable 
Balance of payments and exchange rate dynamics
The properties of the balance of payments and exchange rate dynamics in this two-region setting are such that any increase in a variable of one region causes a decrease in the other region. The following set of six indicators constitute the core of the analysis:
The trade balance reacts immediately. It adapts to changes in wealth induced by the financial market shock and dynamically adjusts to investment flow patterns:
The current account balance is composed of the trade balance and net investment income:
The international investment position of the core or its amount of net foreign assets/debt:
The real interest rate is a variation on the golden-rule rate of interest accounting for real exchange rate changes, changing weights of the countries and costs of domestic and foreign investment:
The terms of trade from which the real exchange rate is calculated, are as follows:
The long term share of assets of the core in the overall number of capitalizable assets consists of a country's past current account balances with respect to current overall wealth:
The dynamics of these six equations will be presented in the simulation results below.
Solving the non-linear dynamic system
The system of equations constitutes a non-linear dynamic system which cannot be uniquely solved. The model contains four dynamic equations, which can be approximated using an iterative simulation procedure. 
The simulation consists of a building period ( t = 0 − ) before the shock, the time of the shock ( t = 0 ), the immediate aftermath of the shock ( t = 0 + ) and a secession of periods following the shock ( t > 1 ). After ( t = 0 + ) the regions in the model converge to a new steady-state-like equilibrium for which all parameters asymptotically converge to a new set of values.
The state variables of the model are not directly affected by the shock. They change in accordance with the new model dynamics and bring about the new equilibrium:
The solution to the non-linear dynamic system of equations is obtained by initially guessing and/or calibrating the shock to the capital values on the financial market. This loss in capital values feeds into wealth, which then depresses consumption in favour of savings. Savings generate intra-country flows of funds. These flows are the result of the initial shock and feed into the parameter values in the post-shock periods. At the 'end' of simulation time, capital values, wealth and all dynamics reach a steady-state value without further change. The final value is then used to calculate the present value of capital assets, which is then applied to update the initial guess of the capital market shock. Consecutive iterations use updated values.
Calibration and data
The model is calibrated using the same techniques as in Caballero et al. (2008) 
Simulations results for the euro area
Baseline results -core-periphery (GIPS)
The simulation results are shown in 0depicting the course of actual and of estimated variables of periphery countries (GIPS) against the remaining EMU-12 countries (core). The 'baseline' scenario shows the equilibrium path of the periphery's current account, net foreign assets (debt if negative), interest rates and the real exchange rate given the financial market shock from lowered interest differentials after 1999. The 'actual' line shows the de facto development between 1997 and 2011 and serves as the frame of reference for all subsequent simulations.
The financial market shock through EMU accession at time 0 (beginning of the two-year convergence period in 1997) has resulted in considerable current account deficits of the periphery. The development of the current account is shown by the line labelled actual, which signals increasing deficits in the top left hand pane of 0. These deficits are due to trade deficits on the one hand as illustrated in the top right hand pane. In addition, the initial real depreciation of the exchange rate in the first five years has been reversed and turned into a strong appreciation depicted in the bottom centre pane favouring a negative current account. The main outcome of the baseline simulations is therefore the inability of periphery countries to reverse their accumulated current account positions by real exchange rate depreciations alone. Therefore, we present two alternative simulations, which might provide strategies for an adjustment leading to more sustainable net foreign debt levels.
Alternative 1: Increasing investment
Investment in productive capital is a straightforward proposal to increase production and thus reduce the denominator of the debt-to-output ratio. More investment could be carried out in the core and periphery by increasing the net investment share κ . The average calibrated net investment parameter from gross capital formation less consumption of fixed capital 8 Simulations using the GIIPS countries as periphery yield similar, yet more attenuated results.
-22 -(depreciation) is found to be higher in the periphery (8.2%) than in the core (6.2%). It can be understood as the effort made to maintain the current capital stock and invest in new capital to sustain growth. If the overall level of investment were increased to the periphery's level, demand from core countries for periphery's capital goods would surge because of relatively lower investment costs in the periphery.
Figure 7
Simulation results for the PIGS-periphery assuming investment variation in the core countries Source: own computations
The top center pane of Figure 7 shows a significantly higher sustainable debt level for the scenario labeled 'High Inv(estment)'. The sustainable debt level increases to 86.5% (year 13) while the current account can stay slightly more in deficit (1.4% instead of 0.6% for the baseline scenario). Capital exports to the core help decrease the real exchange rate in the periphery by five percentage points (107 rather than 102.3) fostering competitiveness relative to the centre and increasing demand. However, in reality periphery countries are far from achieving this degree of competitiveness: the weighted real exchange rate index is at 90.0 in 2011 and thus overvalued by 19% compared to the high investment scenario and 13% to the equilibrium calibrated baseline case. Unless this overvaluation is reduced, the FDI and net export channels in the model are blocked because they are unattractive to foreign buyers.
Additional demand from the core region for capital or production goods in the periphery cannot materialize.
Alternative 2: Increasing productivity
Improving productivity and thus becoming more competitive internationally is an oft-heard demand for periphery countries. A variation in total factor productivity (TFP) does indeed improve the sustainability of current international debt positions. In Figure 8 a variation in TFP by an additional 1 or 2 percentage points respectively allows greater initial current account deficits. The average weighted current account deficit of the four PIGS countries has increased to a maximum of 10.2% in 2008. Strikingly, this value is higher than the one in the most optimistic "TFP+2%" scenario. It postulates a two percentage point increase in TFP from the financial market shock and goes along with a current account deficit of only 8.4% in year 10 after the shock (2008). In contrast to simulations, PIGS countries did not plunge into deficit after the shock; deficits rather built up over time. Net foreign debt is therefore currently only at a weighted 79.6% since 1999 -16.9 percentage points higher than in the calibrated baseline scenario but within the range of realistic scenarios like a TFP increase by 0.5 percentage point (88.3%) or the above discussed rise in net investment.
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Debt levels can be sustained for longer when future productivity increases make up for current debt by over-proportionally increasing production. This positive link between higher TFP growth and debt sustainability is shown in the international investment position (Net Assets/Output) in the top center pane of Figure 8 . An increase in TFP by 1 percentage point would extend the sustainable debt level from 62.7% to 114% after 13 years (2011). A TFP increase of +0.5% would still allow for a maximum of over 100% of net foreign debt to be sustainable. However, in any case a future depreciation of the exchange rate and a turn-around in the current account position is required to return to the required equilibrium path.
The actual path of the periphery's current accounts has reversed in 2011 to a weighted deficit of 4.3%. Despite this reduction, values are still in the (highly unrealistic) range of the scenario with "TFP +2%" assuming productivity to have increased as a consequence of the financial market shock by two percentage points. Real appreciation in the bottom center pane has prevented debt levels from rising too much so far. However, a future depreciation, which equilibrium in the model calls for, might make current debt increasingly unsustainable.
9 See appendix 6.3 for simulation results of the 0.5% TFP variation not displayed in Figure 8 .
However, a lower real exchange rate is required to bring the balance of payments back towards sustainable levels. In its absence, the only alternative to considerable current account and trade balance surpluses to reduce foreign indebtedness would be lower domestic demand -currently to be seen in some periphery countries in recent times. 
Economic policy implications
In this paper we study the intra-euro area imbalances based on a dynamic general equilibrium model. We show that the financial market shock, triggered by European financial integration and the introduction of the euro, might have contributed to the development of imbalances.
The attractiveness of financial markets in southern Europe improved relatively to the core countries. Based on our model simulations, this explains capital flows from the euro area core to the periphery, persistent trade account and current account deficits in the euro periphery and surpluses in the core as well as diverging net foreign investment positions in the euro area.
More worrisome, our baseline simulation results for the euro area further suggest that foreign debt positions of the euro periphery countries are far from sustainable. Rising debt servicing costs would require a rather strong improvement of the trade balance and a real depreciation.
Only then would lower current account deficits lead to a convergence of the international investment positions of debtor countries. However, future real depreciation would increase the real value of debt and might make current debt increasingly unsustainable. Alternative scenarios, assuming rising investment and productivity, draw a less dramatic picture. The level of sustainability widens to a higher level of foreign debt.
Therefore, today's crisis countries will need to adjust to imbalances in current accounts and net foreign positions not only by real exchange rate depreciations alone. Our alternative simulation scenarios point at two possible strategies. First, investment in productive capital needs to be restarted and accelerated. To unburden the current account, capital needs to be accumulated by rising domestic savings in crisis countries. Second, raising crisis countries' productivity will add to their competitiveness and growth potential. Increasing production reduces the debt per GDP relation and provides income to serve debt.
A precondition is, however, to restore confidence in crisis countries and to solve their banking problems. Both continue to act as an opposite and thus negative financial market shock to the one experienced after EMU accession. Only after overcoming them will domestic savings stay in countries and can investments be allocated to productive sectors. On the other hand, crisis countries need to support investments by substantial structural reforms and enhancing investment conditions. Then foreign debt positions might -in the end -prove to be sustainable again. The shock is calibrated as the mean weighted spread of periphery countries' interest rates measured by EMU convergence criterion bond yields over the core's rate. Spreads are averaged over the last three years of the pre-convergence period 
